Programming Development Funds to Support a Counterinsurgency
This paper describes one method of programming development funds at a sub-national level to positively affect a counterinsurgency, in this case, in Eastern Afghanistan. It is presented as a practical model for both students in the classroom and operators in the field to understand the complexity of a type of mission that the United States has not attempted since Vietnam. The paper explores how one interagency group, the Jalalabad Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT), developed and implemented a strategy for increasing stability in its area of operations by maximizing the resources each agency brought to the table and creating “unity of effort.” In 2006, when the activities described in this study took place, no process or doctrine of any kind existed to aid PRTs in programming funds to influence an active insurgency—and to the author’s knowledge, none exists as of the writing of this paper. The aim of this study is to provide readers with an eight-step process of strategic program development, culminating in the execution of a series of projects, highlighting lessons learned throughout the experience. The eight steps were developed by the command group (CG) of the PRT, which consisted of one representative each from USAID, U.S. Department of State, U.S. Department of Agriculture, and U.S. Army Civil Affairs.